Grammar of Assent: Chapter One
Chapter One Text
The post below is a commentary on chapter 1
§ 1 Modes of Holding and Apprehending Propositions
1.
1 Newman talks about propositions. Propositions consist of a subject and predicate. Newman indicates 3 ways or modes of holding propositions
(a) Interrogative—when a question is asked
(b) Conditional—a conclusion that implies dependence on other propositions
(c) Categorical—an assertion
2 These follow in a natural sequence: question to conditional to categorical
3 These different modes are distinct and exclusive of each other
4 Though distinct these may co-exist “as regards one and the same subject.”
2.
1 Internally holding propositions is analogous to external holding of propositions
Internal External
Interrogative expresses Doubt
Conditional expresses Inference
Categorical expresses Assent
2 Propositions are necessary to have any of these internal or external modes. You cannot question, conclude or assert or doubt, infer or assent.
3 Doubt, inference, and assent are all distinct as the internal modes are.
4 These different modes can become paramount in an individuals and form a distinct way of thinking, e.g. a man with doubt is a skeptic
5 In some minds there is no predominance of anyone mode and many times we all hold different modes simultaneously.
Assent and infer can exist simultaneously
Assent/Infer cannot co-exist with doubt
6 All these modes are natural to the mind. Errors in doubt, inference and assent are attributed to individuals not to nature
3.
1 Newman is interested in this essay on the relation of inference and assent and not at all with doubt.
Note that he calls doubt a “suspense of mind.” To have “no doubt” is equivalent to either inference or assent. No doubt is no suspense of mind.
Doubt is to recognize a proposition as inherently uncertain. “Doubt is nothing else than an assent, viz. an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis.” P.28
2 Newman is now going to give the differences between assent and inference
3 Assent is unconditional and is represented by an assertion
Inference is conditional because conclusion implies premises and in regard to concrete situations inference shows itself conditional because demonstration is impossible
4 Another difference is the type of apprehension necessary for assents and inferences.
There can be no assent without intelligent apprehension of the proposition
Inference does not require apprehension
5 Newman will now deal with the issue of apprehension.
§ 2 Modes of Apprehending Propositions
1 Apprehension means what sense or meaning (interpretation see 4) we impose on the terms of a proposition. What do the subject and predicate of a proposition stand for?
Sometimes they stand for ideas in the mind other times they stand for things external to us.
Newman says external things are unit and individuals. The mind can, by a creative act, bring about generalizations which have no external existence
2 Propositions in which both terms are common abstract nouns, e.g. man is an animal, are notional propositions
The apprehension required for notional propositions is notional apprehension
3 There are propositions composed of singular nouns which stand for individual units. These are real propositions and their apprehension is real.
4 Propositions may be apprehended or interpreted as real or notional
5 The same proposition may be both real and notional to different minds
6 Example of propositions with common nouns as real propositions
7 The same mind at the same time may express simultaneously both notional and real. It is the expert who can see a general law as notional and real. A professor’s recitation of a general law is real to him because he has performed experiments.
8 Real apprehension is stronger than notional. Stronger means “more vivid and forcible.”
Real apprehension does not necessarily impel one more to action than notional but brings facts home to the affections and passions as “motive causes.”
9 Back to conditional and unconditional modes of holding propositions, inference and assents. Inference have a relationship to notional apprehension and assents to real.
10 He has stated his main purpose which is to “treat the distinctions in the use of propositions, which I have been drawing out, and the questions which these distinctions involve.” 31
Chapter One Text
The post below is a commentary on chapter 1
§ 1 Modes of Holding and Apprehending Propositions
1.
1 Newman talks about propositions. Propositions consist of a subject and predicate. Newman indicates 3 ways or modes of holding propositions
(a) Interrogative—when a question is asked
(b) Conditional—a conclusion that implies dependence on other propositions
(c) Categorical—an assertion
2 These follow in a natural sequence: question to conditional to categorical
3 These different modes are distinct and exclusive of each other
4 Though distinct these may co-exist “as regards one and the same subject.”
2.
1 Internally holding propositions is analogous to external holding of propositions
Internal External
Interrogative expresses Doubt
Conditional expresses Inference
Categorical expresses Assent
2 Propositions are necessary to have any of these internal or external modes. You cannot question, conclude or assert or doubt, infer or assent.
3 Doubt, inference, and assent are all distinct as the internal modes are.
4 These different modes can become paramount in an individuals and form a distinct way of thinking, e.g. a man with doubt is a skeptic
5 In some minds there is no predominance of anyone mode and many times we all hold different modes simultaneously.
Assent and infer can exist simultaneously
Assent/Infer cannot co-exist with doubt
6 All these modes are natural to the mind. Errors in doubt, inference and assent are attributed to individuals not to nature
3.
1 Newman is interested in this essay on the relation of inference and assent and not at all with doubt.
Note that he calls doubt a “suspense of mind.” To have “no doubt” is equivalent to either inference or assent. No doubt is no suspense of mind.
Doubt is to recognize a proposition as inherently uncertain. “Doubt is nothing else than an assent, viz. an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis.” P.28
2 Newman is now going to give the differences between assent and inference
3 Assent is unconditional and is represented by an assertion
Inference is conditional because conclusion implies premises and in regard to concrete situations inference shows itself conditional because demonstration is impossible
4 Another difference is the type of apprehension necessary for assents and inferences.
There can be no assent without intelligent apprehension of the proposition
Inference does not require apprehension
5 Newman will now deal with the issue of apprehension.
§ 2 Modes of Apprehending Propositions
1 Apprehension means what sense or meaning (interpretation see 4) we impose on the terms of a proposition. What do the subject and predicate of a proposition stand for?
Sometimes they stand for ideas in the mind other times they stand for things external to us.
Newman says external things are unit and individuals. The mind can, by a creative act, bring about generalizations which have no external existence
2 Propositions in which both terms are common abstract nouns, e.g. man is an animal, are notional propositions
The apprehension required for notional propositions is notional apprehension
3 There are propositions composed of singular nouns which stand for individual units. These are real propositions and their apprehension is real.
4 Propositions may be apprehended or interpreted as real or notional
5 The same proposition may be both real and notional to different minds
6 Example of propositions with common nouns as real propositions
7 The same mind at the same time may express simultaneously both notional and real. It is the expert who can see a general law as notional and real. A professor’s recitation of a general law is real to him because he has performed experiments.
8 Real apprehension is stronger than notional. Stronger means “more vivid and forcible.”
Real apprehension does not necessarily impel one more to action than notional but brings facts home to the affections and passions as “motive causes.”
9 Back to conditional and unconditional modes of holding propositions, inference and assents. Inference have a relationship to notional apprehension and assents to real.
10 He has stated his main purpose which is to “treat the distinctions in the use of propositions, which I have been drawing out, and the questions which these distinctions involve.” 31